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WHEN JUSTICE GOES TO WAR:
PROSECUTING TERRORISTS BEFORE
MILITARY COMMISSIONS
DIANE F. ORENTLICHER* AND ROBERT KOGOD GOLDMAN"
I. INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 triggered an
intense debate that continues to the present day: were they
monstrous crimes- or acts of war? Should the U.S. response be
shaped by a military or criminal justice paradigm? Framed this
way, the debate poses a classic false dichotomy. The
international community has strongly supported the United
States in its claim that the September 11 attacks constituted an
armed attack justifying military action against the Al Qaeda
network and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan. At the same
time, other countries are working hand in hand with U.S. law
enforcement agencies in a criminal investigation of global
sweep.
But if crimes of terrorism can also be acts of war, it is a
mistake to conflate the two. President Bush's November 13,
2001 Military Order authorizing military commissions to
prosecute suspected terrorists does just that, treating virtually
any foreign national whom the President suspects of terrorist-
related activity as an enemy belligerent, regardless of whether
the United States is engaged in armed conflict. In doing so, the
Military Order exceeds the President's constitutional authority
to establish military commissions and imperils core
constitutional values.
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Even when legally permissible, military commissions are
generally an unwise choice among the options available for
trying those believed to be responsible for the attacks of
September 11 and other crimes of terrorism. Far better to try
them before federal courts, as the United States has successfully
done as recently as this year in connection with two other
horrific crimes committed by members of Al Qaeda- the 1998
terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
II. THE LEGALITY OF THE MILITARY ORDER
A fundamental feature of the Military Order is that it invokes
presidential war powers to support the prosecution of
suspected terrorists before military commissions. Citing the
President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of
the armed forces,' the Order provides that the President may
order certain individuals to be detained by the Secretary of
Defense and to be prosecuted exclusively before military
commissions "for violations of the laws of war and other
applicable laws by military tribunals."2 But in a legal and
conceptual non-sequitur, the Order defines its field of
application in terms of individuals whom the President
suspects of participation in international terrorism, a term the
Order nowhere defines, against the United States.3 Thus the
President seeks to detain suspected terrorists on the basis of his
authority to prosecute war criminals. Like the figures in M.C.
Escher's lithograph "Verbum" that morph from frogs into birds
and then fishes, the President's order shifts from one legal
paradigm to another.
For reasons we explain in the next section, this aspect of the
Military Order renders much of the Order constitutionally
flawed. More particularly, the Military Order exceeds the
province of presidential war powers when it purports to
1. Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism preamble, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001),
[hereinafter Military Order].
2. Id., §§ 1(e), 2(b), at 57,833-34.
3. The Military Order provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of military
commissions over any non-U.S. citizen who, in the President's estimation, there is
reason to believe (1) "is or was a member of ... al Qaida," (2) has criminally
participated in "acts of international terrorism" that have injured or adversely
affected the United States or may do so, or (3) has "knowingly harbored" someone
included in either of the first two categories, when "it is in the interest of the
United States that such individual be subject to this order." Id., § 2, at 57,834.
[Vol. 25
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subject civilians in the United States to trial before military
commissions because they may have supported Al Qaeda
operatives or other individuals suspected of participation in
international terrorism. When acts of terrorism take place in
peacetime, as they frequently do, they are not triable as war
crimes under international law and the President cannot make
them so by the stroke of a pen.
A. Legal Authority for Military Commissions
The principal federal law cited in support of the Military
Order contemplates the possibility of convening military
commissions "with respect to offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be tried by military
commission."4 In U.S. law and practice, military commissions,
courts, and tribunals have four distinct types of jurisdiction, of
which only two are relevant here-"martial law" and "law of
war" jurisdiction.5
Although the scope of martial law jurisdiction is contested, it
generally applies when the President directs the military to
exercise judicial authority in parts of the country where the
civilian court system is no longer functioning due to war,
insurrection, or a comparable disaster. The Military Order is
carefully scored with this theme, asserting, for example, that
future terrorist attacks "may place at risk the continuity of the
operations of the United States government. "6
But the leading case on martial law jurisdiction, Ex parte
Milligan,7 makes clear that this risk would not justify the
exercise of military jurisdiction over U.S. citizens, and indeed
the Military Order explicitly applies only to non-citizens.8 In
4. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994), cited in Military Order, supra note 1, preamble, at
57,833. The other statutory provision relied upon by President Bush, 10 U.S.C. §
836 (1994), authorizes the President to prescribe procedures for trials before
various types of military tribunals.
5. By far the most significant use of military courts by the United States relates
to prosecutions of members of the U.S. armed forces. Sometimes called "military
justice," this type of jurisdiction is exercised by courts martial. The fourth type of
military jurisdiction, "military government" jurisdiction, would come into play if
the United States occupied part or all of a foreign country at the end of a war, as it
did in the American zone of Germany after World War II.
6. Military Order, supra note 1, § 1(c), at 57,833.
7. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
8. Military Order, supra note 1, § 2(c), at 57,834. It is unclear whether the
constitutional protections upheld in Milligan would now be limited to U.S.
citizens. Cf. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (finding that the indefinite and
No. 2]
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Milligan, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the trial of a
citizen of Indiana by a military commission convened in
Indianapolis during the Civil War. In the words of the Court
majority, military jurisdiction that is founded on the "laws and
usages of war . . .can never be applied to citizens in states
which have upheld the authority of the government, and where
the courts are open and their process unobstructed,"9 unless
the citizens are members of the armed forces.
The Court recognized that there are circumstances in which
martial rule can be imposed, but the contemporary threat of
terrorism does not meet the Court's stringent test:
If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually
closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice
according to law, then, on the theatre of active military
operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to
furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown,
to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no
power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by
martial rule until the laws can have their free course.10
But, the Court continued, "[m]artial rule can never exist where
the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed
exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of
actual war.""
It is not hard to see why the right to trial by jury was
jealously guarded by the Supreme Court, even in respect to a
defendant charged with conspiring to overthrow federal
authority by force of arms when the nation was at war. Against
the claim that recourse to martial law was justified by the
imperatives of security in war time, the Court replied: "Civil
liberty and this kind of martial law cannot endure together; the
antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict, one or the
other must perish."1
2
At the proverbial first blush, President Bush's order finds
stronger support in Ex parte Quirin,'3 a leading U.S. case on
potentially permanent detention of even unlawful aliens who have entered the
United States would raise a serious constitutional problem).
9. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121.
10. Id. at 127.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 124-25. See also id. at 126 ("If this [claim] were true, it could well be
said that a country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of
liberty, is not worth the cost of preservation. Happily, it is not so.").
13. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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"laws of war" jurisdiction of military commissions. This 1942
Supreme Court decision arose out of the surreptitious entry
into the United States of eight German saboteurs (one of whom
may have possessed U.S. citizenship) bearing explosives and
incendiary devices. Acting under instruction from the German
High Command, the eight apparently intended to destroy war
industries and facilities in the United States. Soon after their
arrival and capture, President Roosevelt issued an order
authorizing the trial of the saboteurs before a military tribunal.
Upholding the lawfulness of the saboteurs' trial, the
Supreme Court distinguished Milligan on the ground that the
defendants "were charged with an offense against the law of
war which the Constitution does not require to be tried by
jury."'4 Crucial to this conclusion was the Court's finding that
the petitioners were ,"unlawful combatants" since they
operated as enemy combatants "without uniform or other
appropriate means of identification." 5 Under international law,
the Court reasoned, unlawful combatants "are subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render
their belligerency unlawful." 6  In the Court's view,
constitutional guarantees of trial by jury and presentment to a
grand jury were not intended to enlarge the scope of these
rights as they existed at common law, and unlawful
belligerents had long been subject to military jurisdiction.17
Much like the Supreme Court's validation of President
Roosevelt's decision to intern American citizens of Japanese
descent during World War II, Quirin has long been criticized as
an abdication of independent judicial judgment during war
time and an unwarranted surrender of constitutional rights.
Even the author of the Court's opinion, Chief Justice Stone,
reportedly had grave misgivings about the judgment he
penned.'8
14. Id. at 29.
15. Id. at38.
16. Id. at 31. This feature of the Court's reasoning has been faulted as a mistaken
interpretation of international law. At the time Quirin was rendered, a combatant
who failed to distinguish himself as required by customary law did not thereby
violate the laws of war, although his specific hostile acts may have. See Maj.
Richard R. Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 339-40 (1951).
17. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38-40.
18. See Tony Mauro, A Mixed Precedent for Military Tribunals: 1942 Case of Nazis
on U.S. Soil Gives Administration the Authority for Terrorist Trials, but Leaves Room for
No. 2] 657
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But even if the authority of Quirin were beyond question, it
would provide only limited support for President Bush's
Order. At most, Quirin supports the use of military
commissions to try those responsible for the September 11
attacks and others suspected of violating the laws of war that,
by definition, can occur only in the course of armed conflict.
Like the German saboteurs of 1942, the men who hijacked four
civilian aircraft and transformed them into human missiles can
fairly be regarded as unprivileged combatants.19 In the context
of the armed conflict in Afghanistan, the United States could
treat Al Qaeda as a paramilitary organization and its members
as unprivileged combatants who do not observe the basic rules
of warfare as required by Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949.20 As unprivileged combatants, Quirin
holds, these individuals are not entitled to the constitutional
protections of presentment to a grand jury and trial by jury.
But President Bush's Military Order reaches far beyond the
authority sustained in Quirin, authorizing the detention and
trial before military commissions of any alien whom the
President determines at his sole discretion has "aided or
abetted" terrorism that has injured or potentially could injure
U.S. citizens or a broad class of U.S. interests or who the
President believes may have "harbored" a terrorist. Moreover
the Order imposes no temporal limit on conduct that can be
lawfully scrutinized and judged by these tribunals. Thus, for
example, a long-term resident alien who in 1998 gave money,
directly or indirectly, to Al Qaeda but had no involvement in
the September 11 attacks could be deemed an aider and abetter
and thus detained on the authority of the Military Order. But
these individuals cannot be tried for violations of the laws of
Doubt, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at 15.
19. Unprivileged combatants include civilians who actively engage in
hostilities, as well as irregular combatants who fail to distinguish themselves from
the civilian population or otherwise fail to meet the requirements of privileged
combatant status. Robert Kogod Goldman, Irregular Combatants and Prisoner of War
Status, in LIBER AMICORUM HtCTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO 767, 769-79 (1998). The 19
individuals who hijacked four civilian aircraft on September 11 entered the United
States with the apparent intention of carrying out attacks and held themselves out
as civilians. As noted in the text, members of Al Qaeda engaged in armed conflict
with U.S. forces in Afghanistan could also be deemed unprivileged combatants.
Accordingly, upon capture they would not be entitled to prisoner of war status
and could be tried for all their hostile acts, including pre-capture offenses.
20. Convention (No. III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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war when no state of hostilities, de facto or de jure, existed as
between the U.S. and Al Qaeda before September 11.
It remains to be noted that the Military Order, which finds its
principal support in the precedent of Quirin, defies Quirin itself
by purporting to deny persons detained pursuant to the Order
the right "to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding,
directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or
proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in... any court
of the United States."2' This provision substantially tracks
language in the presidential proclamation underlying the trial
of German saboteurs during World War H.22 Yet the Supreme
Court had no trouble concluding that the saboteurs could have
recourse to federal court to challenge the lawfulness of their
prosecution before a military commission.23
B. Procedural Protections
Our discussion in the previous section focused on whether
the Military Order exceeds the President's authority to convene
military commissions. An equally important question is
whether individuals prosecuted under the authority of the
Order will be afforded procedural safeguards required by
international law.
1. Jurisdiction Over Civilians
Insofar as it permits civilians to be tried by such
commissions, the Military Order is utterly inconsistent with the
international legal obligations of the United States. Human
rights instruments binding on the United States mandate that
criminal defendants, whatever their offenses, be tried by
independent and impartial courts that afford generally
recognized due process guarantees. By their very nature,
military commissions do not satisfy this basic test. The military
justice system in the U.S. and elsewhere is not part of the
independent civilian judiciary, but rather is part of the
21. Military Order, supra note 1, § 7(b)(2), at 57,835.
22. See Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. § 309 (1938-1943), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. §
906 (1994).
23. See Quiin, 317 U.S. at 25. See also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (the
Executive Branch could not "withdraw from the courts the duty and power to
make such inqu1 into the authority of the [military] commission as may be made
by habeas corpus' unless "there was suspension of the writ').
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
Executive Branch. Under the Military Order, the U.S. military,
which is also charged with the destruction of terrorists on the
battlefield, would become the prosecutor and judge of its
alleged adversaries.
When active duty military officers assume the role of judges,
they remain subordinate to their superiors in keeping with the
established military hierarchy. The manner by which they
fulfill their assigned task might well play a role in their future
promotions, assignments, and professional rewards. It is
because of this inherent dependence that these tribunals are not
suited to try civilians. And where, as here, the putative
defendants before these military commissions are the military's
avowed enemies, these tribunals cannot reasonably be expected
to be, nor will they be seen as, objective finders of fact and
dispensers of impartial justice.
Similar considerations have led the Inter-American
Commission and Court of Human Rights, as well as the U.N.
Human Rights Committee, to find that the use of military
courts to try civilians in Guatemala,24 Peru,' Chile,26 Uruguay27
and elsewhere violated fundamental due process rights.
Moreover, no human rights supervisory body has yet found the
exigencies of a genuine emergency situation, such as that now
faced by the U.S., to justify suspending basic fair trial
safeguards even on a temporary basis.
24. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation
of Human Rights in the Republic of Guatemala, OEA/Ser.L./V/II. 61, doc. 47, at
96 (1983).
25. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Second Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Peru, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 59 (2000); see also
Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (1999) (judgment), in ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1999,
OEA/Ser.L./V/III.47, doc. 6, at app. IX, 211-300 (2000).
26. See Comision Inter-Americana de Derechos Humanos; Segundo Informe
sobre la Situacion de los Derechos Humanos en Chile, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.37, doc.
19 (1976).
27. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation
of Human Rights in Uruguay, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.43, doc. 19 (1978); see also
Moriana Hernandez Valentini de Bazzano v. Uruguay (Comm. No. 5/1977),
Views of the Human Rights Committee of August 15, 1979, Selected Decisions
Under the Optional Protocol, at 40-43, U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985). See
generally Commment 13: Equality Before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public
Hearing by an Independent Court Established by Law, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
U.N. Doc. 13/04/84 CCPR (1984).
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2. Jurisdiction Over Unprivileged Combatants
The rights that must be accorded to unprivileged combatants
in criminal proceedings have evolved substantially since World
War II. Any doubts concerning the scope and content of these
rights were put to rest with the elaboration of Article 75 of
Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.'
Although the United States has not ratified the Protocol, it
accepts many of its provisions as being declaratory of
customary law; Article 75 is such a provision par excellence. 9
Largely inspired by human rights law, this article requires that
unprivileged combatants be accorded in all circumstances trials
by impartial and regularly constituted courts that, at a
minimum, afford inter alia the presumption of innocence, the
right to counsel before and during trial, the right of defendants
to call witnesses and to examine witnesses against them,
freedom from ex post facto laws, and the right of defendants
not to testify against themselves or to confess their guilt.
President Bush's Military Order does not even purport to
provide these safeguards. ° Although the Order states that
defendants before military commissions shall be granted a full
and fair trial, it does not expressly guarantee the presumption
of innocence or the right of defendants to counsel of their
28. Protocol 1: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
June 8,1977,1125 U.N.T.S. 37-78.
29. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW 64-65 (1989).
30. That the Military Order denies fundamental rights is not surprising in light
of statements by senior officials of the Bush Administration at the time the Order
was adopted. Vice President Richard Cheney, for example, defended the Military
Order on the asserted ground that individuals behind the September 11 attacks
"'don't deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an
American citizen going through the normal judicial process."' Peter Slevin and
George Lardner, Jr., Bush Plan for Terrorism Trials Defended; Military Tribunals
Appropriate in War, Ashcroft Says; Critics Cite Constitution, WASH. POST, Nov. 15,
2001, at A28 (quoting Vice President Richard Cheney). Of course this statement
presumes what must be proved at trial-that the suspects were in fact responsible
for the September 11 attacks. Yet the President need only suspect individuals of
participation in terrorism (conduct the Military Order does not even define) to
consign them to detention and, if tried, to trial before a military commission. The
Military Order does not prescribe a standard of suspicion that must be met before
the President can order individuals detained. Instead, the Order authorizes the
President to order individuals detained if, in his view, "there is reason to believe"
that they have been members of Al Qaeda or have either supported terrorist
activity or knowingly harbored terrorists. Military Order, supra note 1, §2 (a)(1), at
57,834.
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choice; it denies defendants any remedy, including appeal and
habeas corpus, to either a U.S. or international court; and it
potentially bars defendants from seeing the evidence against
them. In light of these deficiencies, Spain has indicated that it
may not extradite to the United States individuals it has
charged with complicity in the September 11 attacks without
assurances that they will be tried by civilian courts and not be
subject to the death penalty.31 Other EU member states, which
are parties to European human rights treaties, are expected to
follow suit.
The problematic features of the Military Order could be
addressed through procedural rules governing the conduct of
trials before military commissions. Yet draft regulations
described in media accounts in late December go only part of
the way toward addressing these concerns.32
III. CIVILIAN JUSTICE
The thrust of the international fair trial standards addressed
in Part II.B is to ensure that all persons charged with criminal
offenses, including unprivileged combatants, not be tried in a
rush to judgment in the kind of summary proceedings
contemplated in the Military Order. Thus even where military
commissions might be lawfully available, such as in respect to
unprivileged combatants, defendants must be afforded the
safeguards recognized in Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1. If
the Bush administration insists on using military commissions
to try some unprivileged combatants, the Military Order
should be amended to allow civilian review of convictions and
sentences. This would provide a crucial check against the
inherent risk of partiality of military judges who are charged
with evaluating the guilt of their avowed enemies.33
But another approach, trial before federal courts, is far
31. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Spain to Study U.S. Requests to Extradite Terror Suspects,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 2001, at B4.
32. See Charles Lane, Terrorism Tribunal Rights Are Expanded; Draft Specifies
Appeals, Unanimity on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2001, at Al; Charles
Lane, Bush Calls Draft on Tribunals "Preliminary," WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2001, at
A8.
33. As described in various media accounts, draft regulations circulating within
the Bush administration in late December provide for review of military
commission judgments, but the review apparently would be before a military
body. See Lane, Bush Calls Draft on Tribunals "Preliminary," supra note 32.
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preferable. Recent convictions of members of the Al Qaeda
network show that U.S. courts are fully capable of meeting the
challenges presented by cases involving terrorism, including
those relating to the use of classified evidence.' Some
commentators have argued, however, that trying terrorists in
federal court may unfairly expose jurors to intimidation. To the
extent this is a valid concern, Quirin points the way to a
solution. Since, according to Quirin, unprivileged combatants
are not constitutionally entitled to trial by jury, they could be
tried before a federal judge if the risk of juror intimidation were
substantial. Above all, the deepest interests of this nation
counsel us to stay the hand of military justice: to renounce
federal court jurisdiction over crimes of terror is to concede a
powerful victory to those bent on destroying cherished
symbols of our national life.
34. While these trials have generally been based on statutes involving crimes of
terrorism and other offenses against life and property, unprivileged combatants
could also be prosecuted in federal court for war crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441
(Supp. 1997).
No. 2]
